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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 03/01/2008 Accident number: 446 
Accident time:  Accident Date: 13/02/2007 
Where it occurred: AF/2008/183551 069, 
Qalacha-e-Ghazi 
village,  Kohsaan 
district, Herat Province
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 20/02/2007 
ID original source: BOI OPS/03/01-32 Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  




Date record created: 28/12/2007 Date  last modified: 03/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 3 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
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Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to 
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
BoI report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. 
  
BOARD OF INQUIRY 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr [Name removed], Programme Manager for the United Nations Mine Action Centre for 
Afghanistan (UNMACA) convened a Board of Inquiry (B01) team tasked with investigating the 
circumstances into the death of [the Victim], a deminer with the [Demining group], Mine 
Clearance Team Six ([Demining group] MCT-6). 
 
The BOI comprised the following personnel: 
a. Mr [Name removed] (UNMACA Senior Technical Advisor — Operations), 
b. Mr [Name removed] (UNMACA Area Coordinator), 
c. Mr [Name removed] (Acting Area Manager — AMAC West), and 
d. Mr [Name removed] (Operations Coordinator [Demining group]). 
 
Attached to the BOI as observers were; 
a. Mr [Name removed] (Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) Technical Advisor to 
[Demining group]), and 
b. Mr [Name removed], ([Demining group] Field Officer — Herat). 
 
GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER 
The clearance site (MF 069) surrounds the Chaghaty Security Post approximately 1km South 
of Kalat-e-Nayab Ghafor Village that is located within close proximity to the Afghanistan 
border with Iran. It is part of the Koshan District of Herat Province, Afghanistan. 
 
The terrain is flat and open, with hard dry sandy soil with small stones. The weather on the 
morning of the accident was clear and cool with no rain. 
 
PRIORITY OF TASK 
AF/2008/183551MF-0069 is identified in the Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS) as 
a Low Priority task but was reassessed as High priority by a Iandmine impact assessment 
team (LIAT) from AMAC West as the result of injuries occurring to local people at the 
suspected hazard area (SHA). 
 
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
The site layout is in accordance with [Demining group]'s SOPs and site is well marked to 
define the safe and hazardous areas. A detailed drawing of the site layout is attached at 
Annex B to this report. 
 
MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
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As a result of the area being cleared, being too small to support any additional deminers, the 
victim was detached from his section and working under the supervision of 2 Section Leader, 
[Name removed]. 
 
A previous accident had occurred to the same [Demining group] MCT on the site, only six 
days prior. 
 
The BOI found the Team Leader (TL) adopted an unprofessional approach to the 
investigation by continually finding amusement at questions he was being asked and not 
addressing his answers to those questions in a direct manner. He also displayed a marked 
lack of confidence and weak leadership qualities. 
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL 
A Quality Management and Inspection Team (QMIT) from the Area Mine Action Centre 
(AMAC) West had last visited the site on 25 January 2006. An internal [Demining group] 
Quality Control (QC) team had last visited the site on 5 February 2007. 
 
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING 
Communications from the site are good and the accident reporting procedure worked well.  
 
MEDICAL REPORTS (INCLUDING INJURIES SUSTAINED) 
Doctor [Name removed] performed the medical inspection of the victim at the Herat General 
Hospital. The doctor’s report indicates that the victim sustained a severe blast wound below 
the right armpit and attributed the death to a cardiac arrest. 
 
The BOl chairman at the Herat Hospital briefly interviewed Doctor [Name removed] on 19 
February 2007. Dr [Name removed] stated that when the body arrived at the hospital he was 
informed that a bomb had killed the deceased. With that introduction he examined the body, 
found clotting and pronounced that the deceased had died of cardiac arrest. 
 
On further questioning regarding the wound in the right armpit the Dr [Name removed] stated 
that it was an irregular shaped wound consistent with a blast, and if it were a knife wound it 
would be a regular shaped wound. Questioned further on whether it could it be a metal 
shrapnel wound he replied "No that would be a regular shaped wound". 
 
The question was then rephrased "Could it have been an irregular shaped piece of metal 
shrapnel?" Answer "No that would cause a regular shaped wound". 
 




A number of witness statements were compiled by the BOI team and are attached at Annex E 




It should be noted that when the BOI team convened, Mr [Name removed] stated that all large 
shovels should be removed from demining teams, as they were the cause of most accidents. 
In open discussions with [Demining group] and AMAC Herat personnel at the accident site, a 
large shovel was mentioned frequently as being missing. On site, the question of what 
detonated the mine was raised and the general consensus was that the victim might have 
used a large shovel during clearance. On direct questioning to the Team Leader and Section 
leader regarding the use of a large shovel, and the possibility of it being missing, this was 
denied vehemently by both persons. 
 
DEMINING EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS 
The standard set of issued deminer’s equipment/tools were inspected by the BOI 
investigation team and found to be in good working condition with no visible blast marks that 
could be attributed to causing the accident. The metal detector was also not damaged. 
 
 
The exception to this was the 1.0 & 1.2 metre base sticks. Both items were well used with 
their painted safety markings worn away. While the base stick is painted in accordance with 
[Demining group] SOPs (Ref - Pt 2, Sect 3, para 3.2) it is not in accordance with the 
Afghanistan Mine Action Standards (AMAS).  
 
DETAILS OF THE MINE INVOLVED 
The anti-personnel mine detonated is assumed to be a PMN type mine, this assumption is 
based on the fact that the deceased deminer was working on a line of mines and having 
successfully located 7 x PMN mines during the previous 2 days work. The crater was 
consistent with the explosive found in this size and type of mine and was estimated to be 
buried at between 5 and 10 cm. There is no evidence of the mine being booby-trapped. 
 
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING 
The BOI found no evidence of re-mining of the clearance site and this therefore did not 
contribute to the accident. 
 
EVIDENCE OF SITE INTERFERENCE OR TAMPERING AFTER THE ACCIDENT 
The BOI found that the accident site was not preserved intact as required of [Demining group] 
and in accordance with both AMAS and the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
Chapter 10.60 paragraph 5.2. The BOI Team noticed the following discrepancies: 
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a. There is photographic evidence that the site marking was tampered with after the 
accident where red and white marking stones have been relocated. 
b. The deminer’s PPE, equipment and tools were also removed from the accident site 
and taken to the AMAC in Herat. This is in contravention of AMAS but is detailed as 
allowable in part of [Demining group] SOPs (Part 2, Sect 15.6.3). 
c. It is clear that in a photo taken during treatment of the victim that the helmet visor was 
in the "Up" position; however the visor was "Down" when the BOI team inspected it. 
Some explosive residue was found inside the visor and more may have been wiped 
off when it was wrapped in rags for transportation to the AMAC. 
  
 
DRESS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
The deminer was not wearing an issue uniform, and was dressed in typical Afghan casual 
shirt, long trousers, socks and boots. The PPE worn was a standard [Demining group] issue 
ROFI protective jacket with attached skirt/ apron and a MedEng Helmet complete with Visor. 
 
The victims PPE was physically inspected by the BOI team and was found to have performed 
as per specifications with no blast penetration that could have contributed to adding to the 
victim's injuries. 
 
The helmet visor worn by the victim did not sustain any damage and this may have been a 
result of it being in the `up position' at the time of the accident. 
 
USE OF DOGS 
No MDDs are used on this site, although it is a site conducive to this asset.  
 
USE OF MACHINES 
No mechanical machines were being used on site at the time of the accident however an 
armoured Backhoe was being used at an adjacent clearance site. 
 
DATE OF LAST REVISION COURSE FOR TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT 
The team had been involved in revision training only days prior to the accident. This training 
was put in place by [Demining group] as a result of an earlier accident as detailed earlier in 
this report. 
 
DETAILS OF MEDICAL EVACUATION AND ADEQUATE TREATMENT 
The victim was treated initially at the site by the team paramedic at the scene of the accident 
where he was stabilised before being moved to the ambulance and then transported to the 
Herat General Hospital in order to receive further treatment. The victim died on the way to the 
hospital while still in the ambulance. 
 
PARTICULARS OF DEMINER’S INSURANCE 
No particulars of the victim’s insurance were made available to the BOI team.  
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DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT 
The deminer was detached from his section and working under the guidance of another 
Section Leader (SL) at the time of the accident. He had not indicated to the SL that he had 
found a mine and it is unknown exactly what tools were being used, if any, at the time of the 
accident. 
 
The two knee kneeling position is the position observed by all the deminers on the site over a 
two day period, so it is assumed that prior to the blast, the victim was in a kneeling position 
and the victim was observed by two fellow deminers to stumble backwards and fall to the 
ground. The first deminers to arrive pulled the victim away from the hazard area and when the 
medic arrived on scene he commenced to perform first aid. The victims PPE was also cut 
from his body to aid in treatment. The victim was then moved to the ambulance and then 
further transported to the Herat General Hospital. 
 
SUMMARY 
The deceased deminer detonated the PMN mine with an unidentified object. He was in a 
kneeling position with his right side facing towards the mine. The blast struck him on the chest 
and right hand side, causing a fatal wound to the right under arm (armpit). He suffered 
extensive bleeding from this wound and also from the mouth and nose at the time. He was 
evacuated by ambulance but died en route to the hospital. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It is the BOI team's conclusion that at the time of the accident [The victim] was performing an 
excavation drill that was not in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs. This resulted in him 
receiving a blast mine injury that led to cardiac arrest and subsequently death. 
 
The deceased detonated a PMN mine with an unidentified item or object. There were no 
injuries to his hands, feet, or any other appendage on his body. There are no stone fragments 
in or around the mine crater. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE 
The BOI recommend the following; 
a. All members of the victims team undergo a full days retraining under the supervision of 
QMA staff from AMAC West with assistance from [Demining group] QA. The details and 
attendance of this retraining to be officially recorded. 
b. [Demining group] supervisors at all levels are to ensure that correct marking procedures 
are followed at all times during clearance operations. 
c. [Demining group] SOPs be amended immediately in regard to the correct painting of the 
base stick from White to Red and that all sticks are re-painted. 
d. [Demining group] SOPs be amended to reflect that all accident sites should be preserved 
intact until an investigation team's arrival and that all tools and equipment, less valuable 
items (i.e. Metal Detector), be left as they are found at the time of the accident, when 
such valuable items are to be removed, accurate details with photographs are to be 
recorded for the Investigation team. 
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e. The Team Leaders professionalism and leadership qualities should be immediately 
reassessed and his further employment be re-evaluated by the management of 
[Demining group]. 
f. [Demining group] must immediately attend to the "cover up" situation observed on site 
and ensure it is not repeated, as it could initiate the suspension of its accreditation if 
encountered again by UNMACA accident BOI teams. 
 
Signed: Senior Technical Advisor, BOI Chairperson 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 594 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Abdul Haleem (Halim) 
s/o Mohammad Alam 
Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frontal apron Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor (?) 
 





COMMENT: See Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
“The blast struck him on the chest and right hand side, causing a fatal wound to the right 
under arm (armpit). He suffered extensive bleeding from this wound and also from the mouth 
and nose at the time.” The victim died on the way to the hospital while still in the ambulance. 
 
Doctor [Name removed] performed the medical inspection of the victim at the Herat General 
Hospital. The doctor’s report indicates that the victim sustained a severe blast wound below 
the right armpit and attributed the death to a cardiac arrest. 
 
The BOl chairman at the Herat Hospital briefly interviewed Doctor [Name removed] on 19 
February 2007. Dr [Name removed] stated that when the body arrived at the hospital he was 
informed that a bomb had killed the deceased. With that introduction he examined the body, 
found clotting and pronounced that the deceased had died of cardiac arrest. 
 
On further questioning regarding the wound in the right armpit the Dr [Name removed] stated 
that it was an irregular shaped wound consistent with a blast, and if it were a knife wound it 
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would be a regular shaped wound. Questioned further on whether it could it be a metal 
shrapnel wound he replied "No that would be a regular shaped wound". 
 
The question was then rephrased "Could it have been an irregular shaped piece of metal 
shrapnel?" Answer "No that would cause a regular shaped wound". 
 




Letter from Chief of Operations, Kabul 
File: OPS/03/01-32 
Date: 22 Feb, 2007 
To: Director [Demining group] 
Cc: Area Manager, AMAC Herat 
Subject: Follow up action on [Demining group] MCT-6 Fatal Demining Accident in MF # 
AF120081183551069, located at Qalacha-e-Ghazi village, Kohsaan district of Herat Province.  
 
Please find attached the investigation report of the fatal demining accident happened on [the 
Victim] deminer of [Demining group] MCT-6 on 13 Feb 2007 in Kohsaan district of Herat 
province. Attached to this investigation report, there are commentary notes from the 
UNMACA Chief of Staff and myself that are sent to you for further follow up. Please take 
action as recommended in the investigation report by the Board of inquiry (B01) and the 
comments of the UNMACA chief of staff and myself. 
 
The [Demining group] MCT-6 demining operations should be kept suspended until further 
notice. AMAC Herat is advised not to task this team until it is authorized by this office. 
 
 
CHIEF OF STAFF COMMENTS 
Reference: NMACA BOI Report dated 20 February 2007 
 
GENERAL 
I concur with the UNMACA BOI report into the death of [the Victim]. However it must be noted 
that the task of the UNMACA Investigation Team to identify the exact cause of this fatal 
accident was hindered by several factors: 
1. The accident site had been altered prior to the arrival of the investigation team onsite. 
2. The deminer’s tools had been cleaned and removed prior to the investigation team’s 
arrival and the tool which most likely caused the fatality was not available for inspection. 
3. The Team Leader, Section Leader and fellow deminers appeared reluctant to provide 
accurate details regarding the events leading up to, during and after the accident. 
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Furthermore it was apparent during the BOI investigation that the command element of the 
demining team lacked good command, control and judgment and that this fatal accident 
follows within six (6) days of another demining accident which occurred on the same site on 
the 7th February 2007. It was concluded that poor command and control was also a factor in 
this accident. As well as this previous accident the BOI team identified that another accident 
had occurred on an adjoining site days prior to this accident involving a mechanical asset that 
detonated a mine resulting in damage to the vehicle, this incident was not reported to the 
AMAC on the day but several days later. 
 
The poor lack of command and control within the command group of this team is a serious 
concern to me. The Team Leader and Section Leader must take ultimate responsibility for all 
deminers' actions on their site. As a consequence I seriously doubt the ability of both these 
individuals to command a demining team. 
 
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
I recommend that in addition to the BOI and Chief of Operations recommendations, the 
following apply immediately: 
 
1. The Team Leader and Section Leader are dismissed from service with [Demining 
group] immediately. 
2. The operational accreditation/licence of [Demining group] MCT-6 is revoked 
immediately. 
3. When a new Team Leader and Section Leader has been identified then MCT-6 
undergoes a through retraining period. When [Demining group] Management deems 
that MCT-6 is at the required operational standard then they are assessed by Herat 
AMAC QMA for operational accreditation. 
4. UNMACA recommends that UNOPS NY stop the payment for this team for a one (1) 
month period. 
 
Signed: Chief of Staff UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan Kabul 
Date: 20 February 2007 
 
Chief of Operations Comments 
I concur with the recommendations of the Board of Inquiry into the death of [the Victim] 
deminer of [Demining group] MCT-6: 
 
1. The training at all field levels on the field management, training and retraining, 
equipment procedure, demining drills and the importance of the PPE, and QA and 
QC is to be conducted along with the training on the revised concept of operations. 
2. The MCT-6 is to be suspended, retrained subject to end of course evaluation and 
external QA by AMAC Herat. If the evaluation was acceptable the team will be re 
assessed in the field once they are re authorized to commence operations. 
3. The employment of the command group of MCT-6 is to be seriously re looked and 
necessary disciplinary action needs to be taken. 
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Signed: Chief of Operations 
 
 
PHOTOGRAPH OF THE VICTIM 
 
View of Wound to the Armpit 
 
EVIDENCE OF SITE INTERFERENCE  
Day of Accident: - 13 Feb 07 
Note: There are no marking stones on the minefield side of the cleared lane. 
Yet there are marking stones on the cleared side of the clearance lane. 
Comment:  
The rows of Red & White stones on the right of the clearance lane are incorrect. The area to 
the right of the clearance lane is a cleared area, therefore, the stones should only be white to 
designate the lane width and also that the area is cleared. 
Site Inspection - 15 Feb 07 
 
Note: The marking stones have now been moved to the minefield side of the cleared lane 
after the accident. This process should occur after each meter of ground is cleared. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY 
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4. As a result of a demining accident on [[the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] MCT-
06 in task # AF/2008/18355/MF-0069 of Chatgari village, Kohsan district Herat province, 
a Board of Inquiry was convened by UNMACA to conduct an investigation to find out the 
main causes of mentioned accident. 
5. The accident caused a fatal wound to the right under arm (armpit) of said deminer.  He 




6. The investigation report of BOI concluded that the deceased deminer detonated the PMN 
mine with an unidentified object. He was in a kneeling position with his right side facing 
towards the mine. The blast struck him on the chest and right hand side, causing a fatal 
wound to the right under arm (armpit).  He suffered extensive bleeding from this wound 
and also from the mouth and nose at the time.  He was evacuated by ambulance but died 
en route to the hospital. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
7. It is the BOI team’s conclusion that at the time of the accident the victim, [Name removed] 
was performing an excavation drill that was not in accordance with DAFA SOPs.  This 
resulted in him receiving a blast mine injury that led to cardiac arrest and subsequently 
death. 
The deceased detonated a PMN mine with an unidentified item or object; there were no 
injuries to his hands, feet, or any other appendage on his body. There are no stone fragments 
in or around the mine crater. 
The lack of some key command and basic strategies were contributing factors to the accident, 
if the basic rules and standard working procedures are adhered, the  number of accidents will 
decreased. 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
5.     The following points are to be considered: 
1. All members of the victims team undergo a full days retraining under the 
supervision of QMA staff from AMAC West with assistance from [Demining group] 
QA. The details and attendance of this retraining to be officially recorded. 
2. [Demining group] supervisors at all levels are to ensure that correct marking 
procedures are followed at all times during clearance operations. 
3. [Demining group] SOPs be amended immediately in regard to the correct painting 
of the base stick from White to Red and that all sticks are re-painted. 
11 
4. [Demining group] SOPs be amended to reflect that all accident sites should be 
preserved intact until an investigation team’s arrival and that all tools and 
equipment, less valuable items (i.e. Metal Detector), be left as they are found at 
the time of the accident, when such valuable items are to be removed, accurate 
details with photographs are to be recorded for the Investigation team. 
5. The Team Leaders professionalism and leadership qualities should be 
immediately reassessed and his further employment be re-evaluated by the 
management of [Demining group]. 
6. [Demining group] must immediately attend to the “cover up” situation observed on 
site and ensure it is not repeated, as it could initiate the suspension of its 
accreditation if encountered again by UNMACA accident BOI teams. 
 




Witness statement 1 
[Statement by Team Leader (deminer since 1992). 
Not translated (original held).] 
Witness statement 2 
[Statement by deminer (seven years experience). 
Not translated (original held).] 
 Witness statement 3 
[Statement by Assistant Team Leader  (six years experience). 
Not translated (original held).] 
Witness statement 4 
[Statement by Section Leader (five years experience). 
Not translated (original held).] 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a management control inadequacy because the 
investigators’ concluded that the demining group needed extensive retraining, the field 
supervisors should be dismissed, and that the Victim was working “side-on” to the mine to 
receive the injuries he sustained (the body armour did not extend to cover the side of the 
Victim). The demining group had its accreditation suspended as a result. The secondary 
cause is listed as a field control inadequacy because it seems that the field controllers did not 
control the deminer appropriately and did not assist with the inquiry. 
 
The investigation of this accident is considered inadequate because it did not lead to any 
understanding of the events that actually occurred. When interviewing the hospital staff it is 
obvious that the investigators’ were concerned that the fatal wound might have been inflicted 
12 
by other means that a blast event, but this is not resolved. (The cause might have been the 
use of the wrong tool, or a non-blast related injury.) 
 
The investigation was also flawed because: no record of the coordinates of the accident site 
was made; there is no timeline in the original BoI, so that the time of the accident is gleaned 
from the medical details; witness statements were not translated and the senior Technical 
Advisor pressed his own bias to lie down to excavate. 
 
 
The Senior Technical Advisor (STA) included extensive illustrations of how to excavate, which 
are sadly incorrect both in detail and substance. The illustrations include the above, showing 
the “prone” position, which is only used by soldiers working under fire or when working uphill 
on steep slopes. The position is not used for many reasons. For example, the head is 
dangerously close to an initiation if one occurs; the armour is not designed to protect from 
above; the tool actually used in Afghanistan is far shorter than that illustrated; when leaning 
on elbows you cannot work effectively with your hands, etc.  
 
The Senior Technical Advisor (STA) criticised the English language failings of an earlier BoI 
covering another accident at this site, which was conducted by Afghans, in a manner that may 
have been provocative. His own spelling, punctuation and understanding of grammatical logic 
were poor [punctuation and spelling have been corrected]. It is possible that the STA’s 
attitude was the cause of the lack of cooperation. His ignorance of actual demining is 
apparent from his bias towards the “prone” position. The failure of the field staff to co-operate 
with the BoI may also imply that his approach was “confrontational”.  
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